Wednesday, 16 March 2011

Rousseau’s states in his social contract

According to Rousseau’s philosophies there are two potential ‘states’ in which people can exist – a state of nature and a civil state. Perhaps the civil state breaks down into two further options – legitimate authority and illegitimate authority. But lets ignore that minor complexity for the moment.

In a state of nature there are no laws, rules or moral codes which control the actions or thoughts of individuals. It follows then that in a state of nature there can be no such thing as civil disobedience since it would be impossible to determine if this had occurred.

Rousseau proposes a civil state where all individuals would act in accordance with what he describes as the General Will. In answering the question, “can civil disobedience be legitimate?”, it is important to understand what Rousseau means by the general will, and, therefore, legitimate state. Rousseau argues that if any individual applies reason to any question, they will come up with the same answer as any other individual. However, that reason, at all times, must be geared towards providing the best solution for the state – and in doing so provide the best solution for each individual who makes up the state. It follows then that all people, when faced with the same question and applying the same reason, will reach the same conclusion – like a mathematical problem.

Civil disobedience does not necessarily relate to violent action against the state and could occur when an individual reached a conclusion which did not agree with the majority and was prepared to act against it, i.e. it was against the general will.

There are three instances when such civil disobedience can occur:

A - When a person reasons in accordance with the general will but reaches the “wrong” conclusion. If this was a genuine error then it could not be considered civil disobedience. It could be a result of misunderstanding, inability to reason or whatever but if the person genuinely wanted to conclude in accordance with the general will and was willing to accept their misjudgement then there is no disobedience.

B – Where a person reasons in accordance with the aims of the general will but reaches a conclusion which does not correspond with that of others. Further, the person truly believes they are right and followers of the general will are wrong.

C – Where a person has reasoned in accordance with their own particular will, i.e. to satisfy a personal need rather than the wider need of all the people.

According to Rousseau, people taking action as a result of both B and C would constitute civil disobedience. His solution in both instances would be not to tolerate this disobedience and to force people to agree with the general will.

I would agree with Rousseau in relation to civil disobedience fuelled by personal desire (example C). In these circumstances it is morally (and perhaps sometimes even legally) incorrect to implement decisions which have benefits for only a small proportion of the population and inherent detriment to the population in general. For example, conspiracy theorists would have us believe that the war in Iraq is promoted largely by US arms manufacturers and has little benefit for the indigenous populations of Iraq, America and other countries. While the situation is infinitely more complex, there is undoubtedly some truth in these theories and the interests of leading US political figures in arms and oil companies is well documented. However, Rousseau could quite easily argue that if all interested parties (individuals) had access to all of the facts, they may well reason that this is the general will. Sadly it’s a hard one to put to the test.

However, I would argue with Rousseau in his treatment of civil disobedience of the type outlined in example B. Rousseau proposes that the majority is always right. This is not correct. Majority views can easily be the product of misunderstanding, miscommunication, propaganda or whatever. Eighty years ago the majority of people didn’t link smoking with cancer, etc. The main point though is that Rousseau’s treatment of ‘dissidents’ is wholly at odds with his own position as a reformer. He is, until his ideas are widely accepted, the minority. He cannot give himself the right to challenge established and popularly held beliefs without also allowing others that luxury. It’s perhaps telling that no actual state has adopted the General Will as a guiding principle.

It is this latter point which exposes the biggest frailty in Rousseau’s philosophies – that he believes everyone should agree with him.

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